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MR. KEYTE:

Welcome, everybody, to the 47th

Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and
Policy put on by the Fordham Competition Law
Institute.
First, we wish all the best health and
safety in this time of pandemic, which is both tragic
and challenging.
As for the Conference, when Barry Hawk
founded the Fordham Competition Law Institute I’m not
sure he envisioned how international it would be in
terms of antitrust law and policy; and, of course, the
role of economics in the 1970s was pretty much
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nonexistent and just on the horizon in some of the
U.S. courts.

Now we cannot think of antitrust law and

policy and economics without a global focus,
especially in today’s digital economy.
By necessity, this is the Fordham Corporate
Law Institute’s first virtual conference.

All of our

work lives and families have all changed.

We have

gotten used to being more mobile.

We have seen

probably more of our families than even some of them
care for.

I finally learned how to use a computer,

how to do track changes.

But it all seems fitting in

an economy that is fully digital.
For our Fordham Conference we have stayed on
the basic format, with a few changes.
We had a Workshop Day yesterday with two
wonderful economic workshops with Edgeworth Economics
and The Brattle Group.
We typically also have an in-person Heads of
Authority Workshop that is a private meeting, but
instead in the virtual environment we had a Heads of
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Authority Q&A Session yesterday with seven fantastic
heads of authority.

It was very interactive, with

questions and answers and questions from the audience.
Today we start the main Conference.

We have

fantastic keynotes; we have panels on tech and on
mergers; we have a Fireside Chat with Barry Hawk and
Bill Kovacic, which I encourage you to listen in on.
It will be all the more interactive with some
questions at the end of each session coming from you
all in the audience.
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Keynote Remarks
MR. KEYTE:

Let’s get started with our first

keynotes and panel discussion.
Neither of our keynotes nor our panel need
much in the way of introductions, but I will do it
briefly.
For Executive Vice President Vestager, this
is not easy.

She has two extremely critical roles in

the European Union, Executive Vice President of the
European Commission for Europe Fit for the Digital
Age, a very appropriate title, and of course the
European Commissioner for Competition, a position she
has held for a significant period of time.

Prior to

that, Executive Vice President Vestager had an
enormously successful political career in Denmark,
including as Minister for Economic Interior Affairs.
But her real impact has been, especially for
the focus of this Conference, as Commissioner for
Competition and in her Executive Vice President role,
leading enormous investigations and review of policy
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in platforms, in tech, in privacy, in State Aid — and,
in some sense, it feels like it is still just the
beginning because she is so much a leader in this
critical area of antitrust and international antitrust
law and policy.
Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim
has also had an enormous impact here in the United
States.

Like myself, he is from Los Angeles.

to UCLA and George Washington.

He went

People don’t probably

know he has a Masters of Science in biotech from Johns
Hopkins.

He had a very successful intellectual

property and antitrust practice.

He was Chief of

Staff and Chief Counsel of the Senate Judiciary
Committee.

In the Bush Administration, he was very

known for being both creative and practical.
He is extremely active with respect to
cartel enforcement; merger enforcement — I think to
the surprise of many — looking creatively at different
types of analyses on merger effects; and obviously,
very active with respect to the overlap between
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intellectual property and antitrust.
In fact, the amicus program from the
Department of Justice has been quite influential in
the courts.

I think it also gives good ex ante advice

for businesses, and I think it is a very useful and
practical shift from the agencies to do that in their
interaction with the courts.

The DOJ is right in the

thick of it and we look forward to more of that in the
coming months for sure.
Our two panelists are both established and
rising luminaries of antitrust. The panelists will do
a Q&A with the keynotes after their keynote remarks.
Howard Shelanski is a Professor of Law at
Georgetown; JD, PhD in Economics from Berkeley; served
in several roles in the Obama Administration; clerked
in the circuit and then in the Supreme Court for
Scalia; Chief Economist at the FTC; FTC Director of
the Bureau of Economics; and is currently also a
Partner at Davis Polk.
Michele Davis is a true rising star from
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Freshfields in both mergers and Articles 101 and 102
advice, a real litigator on her feet.
post-grad at Oxford, Harvard Law.

Her education:

She will also offer

an interesting perspective on the ground in both
London and Brussels.
Now Executive Vice President Vestager’s
remarks.

Thank you very much.

Margrethe Vestager
Executive Vice President, A Europe Fit for the Digital Age, and Competition
Commissioner, European Commission
EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT VESTAGER: A very
warm introduction.
It is impossible to participate in the
annual Fordham Conference without reflecting on the
history.

It is the longest-running forum for

transatlantic cooperation and exchange in the field of
competition law — so long-running, in fact, that it
was first held in the autumn of 1974, before the
Department of Justice filed its historic antitrust
suit against AT&T.
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In those days, DG-Competition (or DG-IV as
we were called then) was a young, inexperienced
competition authority compared to our U.S.
counterparts, and we came to Fordham and listened and
learned.

We used this knowledge to develop our

approach, often in concert with our transatlantic
partners.
It is particularly true, for example, for
our merger policy, something that crystallized in 1990
with the entry into force of the EU Merger Regulation.
I will spare you the calculation; it is now thirty
years ago.
Today EU competition policy has forged its
path fully invested in shaping the international
discussion, and that is only natural since we have
seen the first-hand benefits of competition law
enforcement and international cooperation in doing so.
As the economy has become more and more
global, harmful practices of larger market players
extended more and more beyond the limits of the
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jurisdiction of any single competition law enforcer.
Formerly, governments signed cooperation
agreements — the European Union and United States did
so in 1991 — but the informal networks behind them
were forged long before, thanks very much to things
like Fordham.
So we are in the right place for a serious
discussion.
The extraordinary events of the last many
months bring up fresh challenges, challenges that call
for serious discussions.

The coronavirus crisis has

hit us hard and it has hit us fast.

It is a crisis of

profound human tragedy — so many people have lost
their lives; so many people have lost their loved ones
— and it is a crisis that also severely damages our
economy; it has forced workplaces to close; millions
of workers have been put into temporary unemployment,
and some even in redundancy.
Emergency measures taken all around the
planet have helped lessen the immediate impact of
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lockdowns on workers and consumer demand.

We can, and

we should, continue to intervene to reduce the harmful
effects on the labor market and on the economy as a
whole.
But we also have another task: to ensure
that the recovery and new growth is in line with our
principles and our strategic priorities of green and
digital transition.
For us in Europe, this will in the first
place depend on a European Single Market that is
unfragmented and that functions properly.

We need

fair and contestable markets because they make us
better off.
flow.

They signal where investments should

They tell us where value is and who is creating

value in the economy.
A deep and unexpected crisis, like the one
we are in right now, doesn’t change any of that.
anything, it reinforces what we already knew.

If

It is

precisely when things are changing fast that we need
to rely on our fundamentals most.
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The crisis and the recovery, as we all sadly
know, have losers and winners too.

So much is sure,

is a given — we know that from our experiences — but
which firms will win and which will lose in the crisis
that we are in and have ahead of us?
experience, that is not a question

In my
that politicians

can answer, at least not very well.
That brings us back to the Single Market.
The more competitive and the more contestable that it
remains, the better investment will flow where it is
truly needed.

The result will be a quicker, a

stronger, a more sustainable recovery, and this is
what we need.

It will be our compass in the coming

months and the coming years and we will need to
manage, to be able to navigate in I think quite stormy
waters ahead of us.
Our competition rules give us a formidable
toolkit to defend the Single Market.

Each of the

three instruments — antitrust, mergers, State aid —
has a role to play, and each of them will be
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challenged by the crisis.
For antitrust it is a priority to continue
to pursue and unmask cartels.

Collusion causes most

harm to competition because it takes place behind a
veil of dishonesty.

Collusion leads to artificially

high prices and slows down innovation.
Just last week, the Commission adopted a
decision against three components manufacturers in the
car industry representing two separate cartels with a
total fine of €80 million.
Part of the antitrust battle lies in being
clear and transparent about what is and what is not
allowed.

To this end, from the very outset of the

crisis we offered guidance.

We provided an ad hoc

comfort letter in relation to agreements to tackle
shortages of essential products due to the Covid-19
crisis.
The Covid-19 crisis is obviously an
unprecedented situation for many sectors, not just
essential products, so we have been open to clarify
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what kinds of cooperation are unproblematic and
identify the necessary safeguards for cooperation to
bring benefits without the risk of unwanted effects.
We have done so through informal feedback to companies
that have been approaching us.

For example, we have

had very useful exchanges with representatives of the
automotive sector.
We must also continue to fight abuse of
dominance.

Dominance is nothing new, but in times of

crisis there is an added concern: when money is tight,
having deep pockets matters, and that heightens the
risks posed by predatory pricing behavior or other
forms of exclusion.
Fighting dominance can also mean changing
our enforcement approach. Yesterday we adopted our
final decision in the Broadcom case, for which interim
measures were announced earlier in the year.

This is

the first time interim measures have been used in a
case leading to commitments, but I don’t think that
this will be the last one. They can prevent
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irreparable harm to competition during the time it
takes to reach a final decision, and obviously it is
when markets are moving fast that this will matter the
most.

They do something else in addition to

preventing irreparable harm while the case is being
investigated: they also create the right incentive for
companies to work with enforcers to reach commitments.
Another key challenge in antitrust is
keeping up to speed on new and emerging areas of
business.

In June we launched a section inquiry in

the Internet of Things to understand the market
dynamics for networked products and services where
data plays a very big role.

With markets shifting,

new technologies emerging, it is likely that we will
bring more sector inquiries in the near future.
Finally, we need to make sure that our
antitrust toolkit is up-to-date, and that may mean new
powers to enforce.

What is currently missing in our

toolbox is the possibility to carry out market
investigations into structural issues that create
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inefficiencies, in particular in digital markets.
We are working on a new legislative proposal
focusing on digital markets which will feature two
complementary pillars: a combination of ex ante
regulation and case-by-case enforcement.
The regulatory side will target a small
number of large gatekeepers, setting out a clear list
of do’s and don’ts.

Yes, you should make certain data

available to platform users; and no, you should not
engage in proven forms of harmful self-preferencing.
The case-by-case enforcement side will allow
us to investigate digital markets and intervene by
imposing remedies where we identify a structural
market issue of failure.
Of course, the reach of these markets means
that this is a shared challenge for competition
enforcers everywhere.

I was very pleased to see in

the report published by the House Judiciary Committee
that it covers many of the same issues that we are
faced with in Europe.
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Regarding mergers, we have seen a temporary
reduction in notifications, although the decline has
been quite small.

There have also been some delays in

responses to questions.

But merger enforcement never

stops.
In the near future we expect to see
consolidations.

I think it is often the case after a

crisis that industry tends to reorganize itself
following a shock.

The biggest issue for us will of

course be to avoid excessive concentration that will
adversely affect European businesses and consumers.
The crisis may also form the background for
more recourse to the failing-firm defense.

That may

be the case if a company wants to a buy weakened
rival. That makes our criteria even more important
than ever — the failing firm’s future in the market;
the availability of other options that harm
competition less; the final fate of the assets if the
firm actually were to fail — and any departure from
these criteria would mean falling into the trap of
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allowing the crisis to lead us away from our
objective, which is to preserve open and competitive
markets.
The final instrument is State aid, something
that, as you all know, is uniquely European.

State

aid is here in order to ensure that companies compete
on real equal terms, also when it comes to subsidies
from Member States.

It also helps Member States to do

more with less by using competition to drive down
costs and by making best use of limited public and
private resources.
Now State aid control is more relevant than
ever.

At the start of the crisis, we adopted

temporary rules to enable Member States to support
businesses suffering from the extraordinary
restrictions taken to contain the virus.

This

response was necessary to preserve value, to preserve
jobs, and also to set the conditions to protect fair
competition.
Given the continued economic uncertainty, we
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are in the process of prolonging and adopting these
rules until mid-2021.

But, of course, temporary rules

must remain temporary, and we are at the same time
thinking about what the right conditions would be to
enable much needed forward-looking investment while
preserving the level playing field.
Which also brings me to my last point, which
is that State aid control also contributes to fight
tax avoidance.

Subsidies can come in many forms — a

favorable loan, a piece of land, a tax advantage given
selectively to a company.

If Member States allow a

handful of companies to pay a lot less in taxes than
their rivals, that undermines fair competition and it
also deprives the public purse of funds for much
needed investment.
Before the summer the General Court — which
for a case is like the first instance — annulled the
Commission’s State aid decision in Apple.

In the

decision we found that Apple received illegal tax
advantages in Ireland.

Of course, we have very
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carefully reviewed the judgment, and after doing so we
believe that the Court has made certain errors of law.
That is why we have appealed the judgment to the
higher instance, the Court of Justice of the European
Union.
For example, we are seeking clarity on a
legal issue concerning the treatment of the different
companies within the group for tax purposes.

It is a

well-established principle that for tax purposes
companies within a group should be treated as if they
were separate entities operating independently from
each other.
However, the judgment seemed to imply that
when assessing the tax treatment of Apple Group
companies in Ireland the Commission should have taken
into account the role of employees and directors of
Apple Inc. in the United States in managing Apple’s
intellectual property, although these were separate
and distinct companies and although Apple Inc. was
paid billions of euros for its management services
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through a cost-sharing agreement.
This has far-reaching consequences.

It is

undisputed that Apple’s Irish Group companies recorded
almost all profits generated by sales of Apple’s
products outside of the Americas.

They were able to

do so because they owned a license to use Apple’s
intellectual property outside of the Americas, and
they obtained that license by making annual payments
to Apple Inc. in the United States under the costsharing agreement.
Unless parent and group companies are
treated as separate entities, companies can have
their cake and eat it.

They can reduce their taxable

profits by paying for a license while at the same time
claim that the profits resulting from that license
should be taxed elsewhere.

In the case of Apple, that

meant for the year 2011 €16 billion of profits
recorded in Ireland of which only €50 million were
considered to be taxable in Ireland and the remainder
was then taxed nowhere.
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We now have to wait for the European Court
of Justice to deliver its judgment, but two things are
already clear.

First, we will continue our efforts to

make sure that selective tax advantages do not
undermine fair competition.

Second, we need to push

ahead to put in place the right regulation to address
tax loopholes and ensure transparency.
I have said a lot, but I realize that I am
actually really just scratching the surface.

I am

sure that, with the wonderful program outlined in the
introduction, in the course of this Conference we will
have a lot to learn, a lot to hear, and have many more
perspectives on the crisis and where we are headed.
This crisis has kept us apart.

At times I

have found it very, very difficult and painful to
manage the lack of a face-to-face, of a real
interaction, of coming together.
I think, though, that now we cannot be any
different.

It has in some sense also brought us

closer together in some ways because for competition
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policy it crystallizes what we share, what we have in
common, as practitioners as well as as policymakers.
I want to thank you for that closeness in our approach
and in sharing, I think a very common and a very
important mission.
Thank you very much.
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“Video Killed the Radio Star”: Promoting a Culture of Innovation
Makan Delrahim
Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL DELRAHIM: Good
morning. Thank you for the earlier introduction,
James, and thanks again to the Fordham Competition Law
Institute for inviting me back to participate today.
I know firsthand we have all recently
learned the challenges of hosting virtual
international events, and I congratulate you for
making this important event possible despite the
obstacles we face.
I also want to acknowledge and thank and say
what a privilege it is for me to appear again with
Commissioner and Executive Vice President Vestager,
for her continued contributions to promote a culture
of competition and for the valuable and constructive
partnership she and I have had these past three years
I have been privileged to be in this job.

We have

accomplished a lot, worked civilly through minor
disagreements, and have together improved in my view
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the free markets to the benefit of consumers across
the globe.
Some of us are old enough to remember that
life-changing moment when MTV launched in August of
1981.

As you may know, the first video MTV aired was

a song by The Buggles called Video Killed the Radio
Star, which happens to be the title of these remarks.
The song is about the transformative power of
innovation.

A new form of musical entertainment had

arrived on the scene and radio’s dominance was under a
very real threat.
Today, nearly forty years later, MTV’s video
stars long since have been killed by technologies that
followed.

That particular song’s sentiment

nonetheless remains as relevant to antitrust policy as
ever.

Innovation and technology continually are

changing markets and the economic landscape, and even
creating whole new industries, industries we couldn’t
imagine just a few years ago let alone forty years
ago.

It is incumbent on competition law enforcers to
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champion policies that support the incentives for the
next generation of the “video stars” to emerge.
The pandemic has underscored the importance
of protecting the climate for innovation.

We all are

counting on innovations in medical science for the
development of strategies to treat and protect us from
infection, and of course every one of us, including at
this conference, are affected, whether it is education
or health or just our entertainment that this pandemic
has forced to move to the digital realm.
Today I would like to share some examples of
the innovations that the Antitrust Division has
undertaken to ensure that we enforce the antitrust
laws in a way that accomplishes the goals of
protecting competition and also supporting growth and
innovation.
Over the past there years, we have taken a
fresh look at the Division’s policies across nearly
all aspects of our work to ensure that they accomplish
these aims.

A mindset of embracing flexibility and
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adaptability served and continues to serve us well as
we pivoted to telework and pandemic-related
competition challenges.

In many ways the pandemic

actually reinforced our perspective, and experimenting
with new ways of doing things provides opportunities
to learn, grow, and ultimately make us better — or, as
I have noted before, anti-fragile.
Of course, competition law, as we all know,
is about protecting a process, not about mandating a
particular result or favoring one competitor over
another.

In that spirit we have focused on improving

processes that promote and sustain conditions of
innovation to thrive rather than directing specific
outcomes in the marketplace.
At the OECD’s Global Forum on Competition
last fall, I was struck by some familiar insights of
Nobel Prize-winning economist Jean Tirole.

He is a

giant figure in the field of competition law and
economics and he has contributed much.

In that

particular address, he offered some advice to
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enforcers for tackling the complex issues we all face
in the digital space.
laws.

He said, “We don’t need more

We need more guidance.”

He called for more

“participative antitrust” between competition agencies
and stakeholders to consider appropriate enforcement
or regulatory approaches to modern competition
challenges.
I agree with Professor Tirole that our
existing antitrust laws are up to the task of
addressing modern competition problems.

Yet, we have

to be flexible; we need to be self-reflective and
collaborative to ensure that our approaches keep pace
with evolving facts and economic wisdom.
The House Judiciary Committee’s report
reflects that. It has taken a look, as our
constitution system with the separation of powers
allows, for them to constantly be looking at the
enforcement regime and taking a look to see if there
are changes that may be required to the system that we
enforce in the Executive Branch.
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The participative approach has served us
well at the Antitrust Division.

In the past three

years, we have improved our transparency: we actively
have updated our Guidelines, made speeches, issued
business review letters, and submitted amicus briefs
and statements of interest to courts in a deliberate
effort to share and explain our analytical processes.
The amicus program was an initiative that we
launched about three years.

It didn’t really get

active until about two years ago.

I appreciate,

James, your mentioning that earlier.

We have seen by

any objective standard the incredible impact it has
had on the development of the law: narrowing
immunities where folks have advanced very broad
immunities and defense in many cases, and also the
proper interpretation of the laws.
Clear guidance helps mitigate the risks
innovators and entrepreneurs face when investing
resources to develop new products.
Whenever possible, we welcome a wide range
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of views, including from industry participants,
academics, and consumer advocates.

For example, we

regularly hold public workshops and post draft
Guidelines for public comment.
The dialogue that plays out in these fora
inevitably leads to better and more thoughtful
results.

You may have noticed that I often invite the

views of my biggest detractors that we have had over
the past few years, and I welcome and thank them for
their views, and I think they add to the process to
help improve the process and the final product.
I would now like to share some specific
examples of the Division’s efforts to promote
innovation, which I will group into four broad
categories: (1) better explaining the state of the
antitrust laws relating to patent licensing practices;
(2) promoting substantive and procedural convergence
with our international partners; (3) modernizing our
domestic enforcement program; and (4) encouraging
innovation within the Antitrust Division itself.
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“New Madison” Approach
I will start with our approach to the
intersection of antitrust and intellectual property
law, a critical area for innovation policy I think.
I first presented an updated and transparent
analytical framework based on neutral principles last
year in a speech followed by an article called The
“New Madison” Approach to Antitrust and Intellectual
Property Law.

This was published in the University of

Pennsylvania Law School’s Journal of Law and
Innovation.
This correctly balanced approach is aimed at
ensuring continued innovation and dynamic competition
in the context of standard setting.

We have cautioned

that antitrust law should not be used as a tool to
police contractual commitments to license standardessential patents on fair, reasonable and
nondiscriminatory (FRAND) terms.

When licensing

negotiations fail, patent owners should have the full
range of statutory remedies available to them when
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their patents are infringed, including injunctions,
the right to exclude.

At the same time, coordination

among members — competitors — of standards development
organizations can raise competition concerns that
should not be overlooked.

We have advocated for these

principles through speeches, guidance documents,
business review letters, and statements of interest in
various federal courts.
I am encouraged that the principles of this
New Madison approach continue to gain acceptance not
only in the courts in the United States but in
international courts as well.
In May, the German Federal Court of Justice
issued its decision in Sisvel v. Haier in support of a
standard-essential patent holder’s enforcement
rights.

The German high court held that an

implementer must take an active role in negotiations
and be willing to take on a license on any terms that
are FRAND.
Other German courts have echoed this concern
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for patent holder rights.

In a decision in early

September in a dispute between patent-holder Sharp
Corporation and implementer Daimler, a Munich court
rejected Daimler’s antitrust-law based defense and
attacks on that system.

The court granted the

Japanese corporation Sharp’s injunction request
against Daimler’s sales of the Mercedes-Benz for
infringing Sharp’s patent which is essential to LTE
technology.
We have also seen that in the UK Supreme
Court’s decision in August in Unwired Planet v.
Huawei.
These decisions are important successes
reflecting the continued development of the thinking
and the proper approach and the convergence of legal
systems around the principles outlined in the New
Madison approach as the right way to look at these in
a way to ensure maximum innovation incentives, and in
doing so they promote innovation.
International Engagement
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This leads me to the topic of international
engagement more generally, which has been a key focus
of my tenure at the Antitrust Division.
With more than 140 competition agencies
around the world, and as mergers and conduct
increasingly draw attention from enforcers in multiple
jurisdictions, convergence on substantive and
procedural approaches is more and more critical.
As the great American innovator Henry Ford
once said, “Coming together is a beginning, staying
together is progress, and working together is a
success.”
I think we have had many successes over the
past several years and I look forward to continued
success with our partners abroad.
We have worked together as a strong
community of international enforcers as we have
reacted in real time to the many challenges posed by
the pandemic.
Since March, the Division has participated
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in a number of virtual events hosted by multilateral
organizations — such as the ICN, OECD, and UNCTAD — to
compare notes on pandemic responses and to make sure
we learn from each other’s experiences.

We appreciate

the opportunities to learn from others in these
unprecedented times and to help contribute our
experience to the extent it is helpful.
We have not neglected our other priorities
in the meantime.
Promoting greater procedural norms and due
process is a prime example.

The International

Competition Network’s Framework for Competition Agency
Procedures (CAP) is a huge step forward toward
harmonizing due process principles, principles that we
have lived by here in the United States, in Europe,
and in multiple jurisdictions abroad.
When I first announced the initiative in
June 2018, at that time called the Multilateral
Framework on Procedures (MFP), I urged competition
authorities to go beyond soft commitments and sign on
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to a multilateral agreement on due process that
included meaningful compliance mechanisms.

Less than

a year later, that vision was fulfilled when the CAP
came into effect through the ICN with seventy founding
competition agencies, importantly including
authorities in Europe, Canada, and the United States.
We all came together and recognized the
importance of sending this signal.

I think through

this agreement we will all be more transparent,
predictable, and consistent as law enforcers, and we
will continue to build trust in our enforcement
actions.
The CAP also represents a remarkable
achievement for the ICN itself, an innovative
organization in its own right.

The ICN was launched

less than twenty years ago by a group of fifteen
agencies, including the Antitrust Division.

Today,

the ICN has grown to include 138 member agencies from
125 jurisdictions.

It has become an influential force

in driving sound policy through recommendations and
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guidance for its members.
A recent example of the ICN’s meaningful
policy work is this year’s Guidance on Enhancing
Cross-Border Leniency Cooperation.

The ICN’s

influence was on display last month at the ICN 2020
conference — which had to be held virtually and
unfortunately not in my home town of Los Angeles —
that was hosted by the Antitrust Division and the
Federal Trade Commission.

It featured spirited

discussions on some of the most challenging issues in
competition policy, including the issues of High
Tech.
The OECD is another great and important
forum for advancing international convergence that
enhances innovation for the benefit of consumers.

The

Competition Committee’s biannual meetings provide an
opportunity for wide-ranging competition policy
discussions.

I mentioned Professor Tirole’s great

presentation this last fall.
Over the last three years alone, we have
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addressed the digital economy, intellectual property
licensing, labor, education, and fin-tech markets, to
name just a few of many topics we have addressed at
the Competition Committee.

It has been a true

privilege for me to have chaired the Working Party 3
of the Competition Committee, where so much has been
accomplished.
Cooperation with respect to specific cases
has increased substantially in recent years as the
number of jurisdictions active in merger review has
grown.
We communicate with our global counterparts
on a daily basis.

Last year, we collaborated with at

least twenty-five jurisdictions on cross-border
investigations and global cartel enforcement and with
fifteen international counterparts on merger and civil
nonmerger matters alone.

These are actual specific

matters of enforcement, not the broader policy
discussions and the convergence, where we engage with
over a hundred agencies through the various fora.
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There is still much work to be done,
particularly as agencies around the globe grapple with
the challenging issues presented by the digital
economy.
At the Antitrust Division, we are
continually looking for innovative ways to strengthen
international cooperation.

For example, in September,

a month ago, I signed a new competition enforcement
Framework among the DOJ, the FTC, and the competition
agencies in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the
United Kingdom. The Framework provides the basis for
future bilateral agreements focused on investigative
assistance.
Innovations in Domestic Enforcement
Let me now turn to a number of domestic
enforcement initiatives that we have launched aimed at
promoting free markets and a culture of innovation.
Not surprisingly, over the past seven
months, responding to the Covid-19 pandemic has been
the key priority.

In March 2020, the Antitrust
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Division and the FTC announced an expedited process
for reviewing and providing guidance relating to
collaborations of businesses working to protect the
health and safety of Americans during the
pandemic. The Antitrust Division has issued four
Covid-19-related business review letters through this
process.

We have done this within a week.

These are

processes and reviews that normally could take nine
months or over a year.
At the same time, we remain vigilant about
combatting anticompetitive behavior by firms seeking
to take advantage of the turmoil.

The pandemic did

not sideline other important efforts to rethink and
improve our enforcement program.
One of these was we withdrew and
reconsidered and issued new merger remedies guidance.
The last one was the Division’s 2011 guidance from
which we withdrew.

The DOJ’s modernized Merger

Remedies Manual, released in September, reflects our
strong preference for structural over behavioral
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remedies as the proper solution to problematic merger
transactions.
As I have explained before, antitrust law is
law enforcement, it is not regulation. We have not
been given a license to meddle in day-to-day business
as a condition of merger approval.
violates the law or it does not.

Merger either
Behavioral remedies

tend to be regulatory in nature and entangle the
Division and the courts in the ongoing operation of a
market, which is inefficient and probably improper in
most instances. Often, these types of behavioral
remedies will distort the market and stifle the
innovation and competition that we should be
advancing.
In a similar vein, we undertook a
comprehensive effort to review nearly 1,300 so-called
“legacy” judgments, some of which date back to the
1890s, in our Judgment Termination Initiative.

We

filed motions in federal district courts across the
country to terminate decrees that were no longer
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needed to protect competition, and in some cases were
potentially harmful to competition.

We posted these

for public comment, we evaluated each and every one,
and I believe we have now terminated a little over 800
of these decrees.
In a recent case, a federal court in
Manhattan terminated the Paramount Consent Decrees,
which for over seventy years had regulated how certain
movie studios distribute films to movie theatres.

As

the court noted, Gone with the Wind, The Wizard of Oz,
and It’s a Wonderful Life were the blockbusters when
these decrees were litigated.

All great movies, but

it just shows the age of when those were implemented.
Our efforts in this regard ensure that
regulatory decrees do not stand in the way of the free
market functioning as it should.

God knows how many

innovative business models the consumers have missed
out on because of just the Paramount Consent Decree;
how many different mechanisms that technology would
have allowed consumers to view and enjoy theatrical
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movies that had been hampered by these consent
decrees.

We hope going forward there will be more

innovation in that field.
It also frees up the Division’s resources
and attention so that we may better focus on
protecting and promoting competition in our day-to-day
responsibilities.
Another example of our efforts to advance
merger policy is the recent update to our guidance on
vertical mergers, which we revised for the first time
since 1984, when the Justice Department issued the
Nonhorizontal Merger Guidelines.
We, along with the FTC, I’m pleased to
report, released joint draft Vertical Merger
Guidelines in February 2020, right before the
pandemic, and conducted workshops to collect feedback
and perspectives from diverse groups.

The revised

final Guidelines, issued in June, provide transparency
into our approach to evaluating vertical transactions,
which we are seeing more of these days.
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Knowing that delays can create business
uncertainty and harm innovation, we also took a fresh
look at our merger review processes internally to seek
ways to streamline our investigations and provide for
greater predictability.
In September 2018, I announced a goal of
resolving most investigations within six months of
filing, provided that the parties promptly comply with
Division requests throughout the entire process.

We

published for the first time a Model Voluntary Request
Letter and a Model Timing Agreement to facilitate
expeditious cooperation and compliance and to allow
for greater predictability and transparency.
We sought to streamline enforcement actions
where possible too.

Earlier this year, the Division

made its first ever use of arbitration to resolve the
proposed merger of Novelis Inc. and Aleris
Corporation. The arbitration proved to be an effective
and efficient way to resolve the one dispositive issue
in the case, which centers, as it often does, around
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market definition, and I expect it will be used again
under the right circumstances.
Turning to an innovation in our criminal
program, last November we launched the Procurement
Collusion Strike Force — or the PCSF as we call it —
which is an interagency partnership among the
Antitrust Division, thirteen U.S. Attorneys’ Offices
across the country, investigators from the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, and four federal Offices of
Inspectors General.

Liaisons from these agencies are

working together to detect, deter, and prosecute
cartels in government contracting.
It has generated an overwhelmingly positive
response from stakeholders.

We have received more

than fifty inquiries to PCSF from federal, state, and
local government agencies seeking outreach training,
assistance with safeguarding their procurement
processes.

Of course, an OECD report some years ago

had noted that proper deterrence in this field would
save taxpayers more than 20 percent in the costs
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outlaid for procurement in the government programs.
So far, we have opened nearly two dozen PCSF
grand jury investigations.

And we just appointed our

first ever permanent Director of the PCSF, Dan Glad,
who is the Assistant Chief of our New York Field
Office and a career veteran prosecutor, and we are now
searching for a permanent Assistant Director given the
overwhelming response we have had.
I have joked that by creating the PCSF I
broke the monopoly that the Antitrust Division has had
on federal enforcement of these cartels and now we
have partnered with the very capable U.S. Attorneys
across the country.
Promoting a Culture of Innovation Within the
Antitrust Division
Finally, I will briefly mention a couple of
our efforts to encourage innovative thinking within
the Antitrust Division itself.
Technological advancements in recent years
have changed virtually every industry within our
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purview.
In August, I announced a restructuring of
our civil program to ensure efficient and effective
enforcement that accounts for these changes.

This

included a realignment of responsibilities within the
civil sections, which created a new section of
Financial Services, Fin-tech and Banking, where we
took various commodities and expertise among four
different sections and put them into one.
We also combined our media and entertainment
sections with our telecommunications section.

Given

the convergence we are seeing in industry, that just
seemed to make good efficient sense.
We also created an Office of Decree
Enforcement and Compliance to dedicate Division
personnel to ensuring proactive enforcement of consent
decrees.

These are consent decrees where the merging

parties had given their commitments to the public
through the Justice Department to ensure certain
conduct and activities and we thought it was important
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to proactively hold their feet to the fire.
In addition, we created a Civil Conduct Task
Force to focus full time on civil nonmerger work where
the parties may not have the incentive to cooperate
all the time like they do in mergers because they want
to get a deal done.

When you are dealing with

nonmerger work, the parties may have other incentives
as far as cooperating with the Justice Department.
We are paying close attention to a number of
emerging issues, and we are making sure we develop and
maintain expertise on cutting-edge issues and
developments.
Last year, we launched a novel program to
build our expertise by training some of our attorneys
and economists in emerging technologies in the fields
of blockchain, machine learning, and artificial
intelligence.

We started with a pilot program of

about nine of our top attorneys and economists.

I

think it is critical to understand these technologies
and their growing business applications in all

48

industries.
We have selected this training through MIT’s
Sloan School, and so far have trained over thirty of
our professional staff, all of whom have had an
overwhelmingly positive response to these courses.

In

fact, I participated in one of them myself.
Conclusion
To conclude, the Antitrust Division is
committed to ensuring that competition policy remains
a force for good in fostering innovation.
Back in 1981, video may have killed the
radio star.

In 2020, however, streaming video

provides a lifeline for the rest of us to carry on
with our lives — from learning, shopping, or enforcing
the antitrust laws — in the face of unprecedented
physical limitations.
Recent experience has shown the power of
technology to improve our quality of life, and also
how much we have come to depend on it.

As The Buggles

put it, “We can’t rewind, we’ve gone too far.”

There
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is no way to predict what life-changing, or even lifesaving, innovations are on the horizon.
We can guarantee that, through vigilance in
our role as competition law enforcers, we will
preserve incentives to innovate while promoting the
competitive process.
I very much thank you, James and Fordham,
for inviting me back.

Regardless of the outcome of

these elections, I anticipate this might be my very
last one as the Assistant Attorney General for
Antitrust.

It has been an absolute privilege to be

here and share these thoughts.
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Panel Discussion
Howard Shelanski
Partner, Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP;
Professor of Law, Georgetown University
Michele Davis, Partner
Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP
* * *
MS. DAVIS:

Thank you very much, Executive

Vice President Vestager and Assistant Attorney General
Delrahim, for those remarks.

And a special thanks to

the Assistant Attorney General to make sure we all
have Video Killed the Radio Star stuck in our heads
for the rest of the day.

[Laughter]

I would like to open the Q&A part of this
session by turning to the subject of merger control
and touching on a few developments that we have seen
on both sides of the Atlantic.
My first question is to Executive Vice
President Vestager.

You recognized in your remarks

that, given the crisis, we are going to see more
consolidation going forward, and also that you and the
Commission will be obviously very focused on avoiding
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any excessive concentration.
We have recently had the General Court’s
judgment in the CK Telecoms v. Commission case
annulling the Commission’s decision which prohibited
the Telefónica UK O2/Hutchison 3G UK3 merger back in
2016.

One of the key things coming out of that case

was that the 2004 Merger Control Regulation regime did
not lower the standard of intervention for these socalled “gap” cases.
I

know Commission officials have been quite

critical of the judgment on the conference circuit in
recent times, calling it contrary to the spirit of the
EUMR.

I suspect you and I may well have very

different views on the merits of the judgment because
I was part of the team advising CK Hutchison on this.
The CJEU is going to have the final say on
interpretation of the “significant impediment to
effective competition” (SIEC) test.

But, as we know,

the wheels of justice do not turn particularly quickly
in Europe, so I am interested to get your view on what
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the judgment means for how the Commission will look at
these sorts of gap cases in the interim period while
we wait for the CJEU to rule.
EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT VESTAGER:

I see

that there is not only an academic interest; there is
also a personal interest that you have in this
question and the answer to it.
One of the things that is very important in
the question on teleco mergers is that you can see in
our practice that we do not have a “magic number.”
depends on the market situation.

It

I think that is very

important to take onboard.
Also, the UK case was a very specific case
due to the way that it was set up with a networksharing arrangement, and I would be very careful to
make that a general thing that can be generalized to
any merger because, first and foremost, I think it is
very important that every merger is investigated on
the facts of the relevant market and how the merging
parties are situated in that market.
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You probably know that we tried to
encourage, at least positively mention, pan-European
consolidation.

We have a number of very big telecos

in the European Union as well, but not as big as you
have them in the United States where the big ones
would have a presence in every state.

I think in

Europe the one with the strongest presence is in
fourteen Member States.
The question is also very much on the side
of the industry if one continues to pursue mergers
within national markets or try to pursue a more panEuropean presence.

We of course do our best to build

a regulatory environment that would cater for having a
stronger single market also when it comes to telecos.
MS. DAVIS:

To follow up on what you said,

the General Court’s judgment can be of wider
application because clearly that was more focused on
the sort of gap case test and has wider application
beyond just the teleco sector.
Can we expect to see any difference in how
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the Commission actually goes about assessing cases in
those sorts of four-to-three scenarios that you
mentioned in light of the General Court’s
jurisprudence on these points?
EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT VESTAGER:

Now that

you have rephrased the question I will rephrase my
answer.
What is important here is that we need to be
able to assess gap cases.

We need to be able to

assess them on the merits of the case.

That is not

changed by this judgment because, since we do not have
a fixed view — I know that some think so, but it is
not a situation that I at all can relate to, that we
should have a fixed view as to the number — then of
course there is no fixed rule for us to revise because
of a judgment.
We of course learn from every judgment.
That goes without saying.
the rule of law.

We live in a Union built on

The facts of the case, the objective

facts that we can see and the facts that we get from
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market participants, are our bread and butter.

So we

will assess any case on the merits of it, and then of
course eventually we will have the CJEU’s take on it
as well, and then of course it will be final, and I
think only then will it be really interesting to see
what will be the final SIEC in cases like this.
MR. DAVIS:

Thank you very much.

I am going to hand over to Howard at this
point.
PROF. SHELANSKI:

Good morning.

Thank you

very much.
Before we turn to the U.S. side, Executive
Vice President Vestager, I would like to follow up on
Michele’s question with another question on the theme
of mergers.

It again stems from your remarks about

the likelihood that in the wake of economic crisis we
are going to see efforts for reorganization of
businesses and some realignments in certain markets.
I think in the global context in which we
operate — that gives rise to this kind of conference —
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a lot of these mergers are going to be
multijurisdictional and touch on a number of different
countries.
The concept that merger notification
thresholds are coterminous with jurisdiction has long
been a central tenet in Europe.

How have stakeholders

reacted to the Commission’s recent announcement that
Member State authorities will be encouraged to refer
cases to the Commission even if those cases are not
notifiable in the referring Member State’s
jurisdiction?
How does this practice fit with the
International Competition Network’s best practices,
which require a material nexus with the reviewing
jurisdiction, and the Commission’s longstanding
advocacy of those practices?
I would be interested to hear really what
you have in mind with that recommendation and how it
will be implemented going forward.
EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT VESTAGER:

As you
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probably know, for quite some time we have had an
ongoing consultation about how we set merger
thresholds; how do we get to see the right mergers
that will have effects in the marketplace.
One thing was the question of minority
shareholding because we had a case that we were able
to assess because it was directly referred to us.
That gave us sort of food for thought: should we
change in order to see more of those without referral?
Here we assess that changing the notification laws
would give us many, many cases but no certainty that
we will actually get to see the ones that were
important.
It is kind of the same thing here.

We have

a worry or a concern about the market effects when
giant businesses buy up smaller innovative businesses
before the scaleup phase.

Without prejudice

obviously, it will be very interesting to see.
far, we have seen the cases based on referrals.
include the Facebook/WhatsApp and the

So
Those
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Microsoft/LinkedIn cases.
Again here we were going through what would
enable us to see these cases.

Again, we found it

would not be proportional to ask all of these cases to
be notified.

That would give a lot of notifications,

a lot of red tape for industry to deal with, and we
did not find that to be proportional.
So we were looking for another way of
dealing with this, and this is why we came to think of
Article 22 and to make better use of those referrals.
I think for a number of years we have been
discouraging this, but I think here we will of course
discuss with the Member States how to make this system
work.
The criteria will be the same.

The

Commission can only accept a referral for a
transaction that affects trade between Member States
and that significantly affects competition within the
territory of the referring Member State.

I think

those two principles give certainty, so it is also
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possible for acquiring companies to have a quite clear
idea of whether or not this is a case that has the
potential of being referred to us.
But we are not done yet because we are still
in the process of discussing the procedural and
practical aspects with the national competition
authorities.

We hope to be done with that, give or

take, late spring next year in order to make this
system work.

There is a lot of unease on our side if

there are things that we miss — but again, obviously
without prejudice, because every case will have to be
assessed on its merits.
PROF. SHELANSKI:

Thank you. That is very

helpful and gives us a better idea of what you have in
mind.

We will look forward to the development of that

framework.
Let me turn it back to Michele for the next
question.
MS. DAVIS:

Thank you, Howard.

I am heading to Washington now and to
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Assistant Attorney General Delrahim.
You talked in your remarks about the
importance of promoting substantive and procedural
convergence with your international partners.

As we

rapidly approach the end of the Brexit transition
period, we are going to see the UK CMA taking over
jurisdiction for a large number of global deals and,
in the words of the CMA’s chief executive, “taking
back control genuinely of the decisions.”
The CMA has shown in recent times that it is
not afraid of applying novel theories of harm and
innovative analytical approaches, and in fact, it is
not afraid of blocking international transactions
involving no UK companies even when in some cases
those transactions have been cleared by other major
and respected competition authorities, including the
U.S. agencies.
The recent abandonment of the
Taboola/Outbrain deal follows a run of CMA decisions
which have contributed to U.S.-centered deals
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collapsing.

Think about things like Illumina/PacBio

and Thermo Fisher Scientific/Roper Technologies.
Given the insurgence of the CMA on the international
stage post-Brexit, do you think it is possible that we
are entering a new era of transatlantic divergence on
certain deals, and what do you think this means for
how the United States and the CMA will cooperate on
transactions going forward?
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL DELRAHIM:
for that question, Michele.

Thanks

That’s a good question.

I think it remains to be seen what transpires.
Certainly, this is a shift from what we have seen over
the past thirty or so years.
I am confident that we will not see the type
of divergence where it is going to be disruptive or
harmful to global competition and commerce.
Taboola/Outbrain was one where we ended up
not taking action. However, we did recognize that the
local facts and the impact on competition were
different in Israel as far as the number of
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competitors who were participating in that type of
product offering.

We had differences in how to prove

the exact market definition.
native ads?

Were we talking about

I don’t know what kind of advertising you

would call it specifically; but is it all digital
advertising — probably not, like the parties had
advanced — but it might not have been the type of
content recommendation but maybe a little bit broader.
We were working closely with not only our
friends in Europe but also the Israeli authority where
the two companies were domiciled.

It is not a big

surprise that you will have a merger that will have
different impacts in different jurisdictions.
The question is: Is the analytical approach
different?

I thought the analytical approach was

largely the same.
Sabre/Farelogix was another one where we
challenged it.

We went through trial and — despite

the judge’s findings of the facts and the credibility
of the witnesses on our side, based on the law, and I
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think a misapplication of the law, in a decision that
has since been vacated — the judge held for the
parties.

We never got a chance to fully appeal before

they abandoned it.

But in the United Kingdom they did

block it.
The analysis and the outcome in those
mergers were exactly the same between us and the
United Kingdom.
It is a very advanced agency with incredible
capabilities in the United Kingdom, with great
leaders, and I think a great and developed court
system there to continue to evaluate the proper
analytical approach.
So I think it remains to be seen.
always is a danger of divergence.

There

I have not seen the

evidence so far, but we have not had the experience
yet with the full Brexit in effect.
MS. DAVIS:

Thank you.

I will hand it back to you, Howard.
PROF. SHELANSKI:
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I would like to depart from the theme of
mergers.

Mr. Assistant Attorney General, I was very

interested in your comment about the efforts you have
taken to strengthen and revamp civil conduct
enforcement.
When we look back over the past twenty years
or so, I think there has been a divergence in the
appetite to pursue antimonopoly cases, single-firm
tech cases, between the European Commission and the
U.S. agencies.

Indeed, we had the Section 2 report on

single-firm conduct during the Bush Administration
that established certain safe harbors and adopted
certain presumptions that made it harder to enforce
those cases and suggested that the U.S. agencies, or
at least the Department of Justice, would not be
pursuing them with quite the (inaudible).
Obviously, in recent times we have seen what
looks like a resurgence of Section 2 cases,
antimonopoly enforcement — certainly the FTC’s case
against Qualcomm and (inaudible) and a variety of
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other cases of lower profile in which we have seen
investigations and enforcement actions.
Is it fair to say that we are seeing a
return or a resurgence of Section 2 enforcement?

Is

this a shift in philosophy or is this driven by
certain market segments?
Is the House Judiciary Committee report that
Executive Vice President Vestager referred to a
harbinger of more of a focus on Section 2?
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL DELRAHIM:

Thank

you, Howard.
I think it is probably a little bit “all of
the above” as far as the factors weighing in.

A lot

of it depends on sometimes how risk-averse people are.
I have been to some extent surprised at how
conservative the enforcers have been about taking the
risks.
I think it is important to advance the law,
take the risk where you can appropriately when there
is a case.

I don’t know the exact numbers, but I
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believe I have opened at least six — it might be more
— Section 2 conduct cases during my tenure, which is
probably more than in the last ten years combined as
far as Section 2 type cases.

It was not just because

we wanted to do that because of a statistic; it was
because we saw cases and we were willing to go after
them.
Part of the challenge is the fact that those
are hard, they are difficult, and there is a number of
factors that feed into that difficulty.
One, the most important, is resources.
are at the resource level of twenty years ago.

We
The

level of complexity and the volume of information that
is available, just because of email and text messages
and the generation of digital documents, is huge.
Now, of course, we have computer-aided search through
the discovery material, but the volume of information
that we get in any investigation is huge and the
number of staff we have has remained the same.

In

fact, the effective budget of the Antitrust Division
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at the FTC is about 25 percent lower than ten years
ago.
For the last two and a half years I have
been pounding the pavement to get it.

Finally, we

have an administration request for an additional 10 or
12 percent increase in budget.

I was pleased that

there was bipartisan recognition in the House report
that the agencies need more resources.
When you have resource deficiencies, you
have transactions, like mergers, that have statutory
deadlines to them; you have to deal with them.
what does that mean?

So

It means that conduct

transactions that do not have deadlines might have to
take a back seat, unfortunately.
You have criminal cartel cases that have
statutes of limitations in them.

Those folks need to

be continuing on, and that has been quite active for
us.
So I think institutionally there has been a
little bit of reticence to advance Section 2.
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Let me throw in another one, which I
mentioned.

Part of the motivation behind creating the

Civil Conduct Task Force internally to address it is
that a lot of our attorneys are trained and think that
because of the statutory requirements for merger
filings.
As you know, Howard — you were a top
regulator at both the FTC and the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs in the White House,
so you know this area — when you have a business that
has a merger they want to get through, you ask them
for information — you know, maybe they play around
with some privileges, but by and large they are
compliant.

You may ask for times and deadlines, but

when you ask them for information they will give it to
you.

Why?

Because the leverage is with the agencies

— if there has been a second request, if they have not
complied —to delay the merger.

So there is a real

natural incentive, and therefore the leverage allows
for the parties to come together.
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Well, that is just not the case.
in private practice, if

Just like

you sue a party, it might

take a while to get that discovery in if they are not
complying.

The same thing with the agencies.

The

parties may take a different action and you need to be
aggressive.

We have come on the brink, literally

within thirty minutes on three different occasions, to
enforce a CID or a second request response which has
been deficient in the Antitrust Division.

Frankly, we

have not done that.
We probably need some enhancements in the
laws to allow the Division and the FTC to enforce that
when the parties do not comply in Section 2.

This is

something that was not addressed in the House report
but something that should be considered.
So a lot of those factors weigh into that.
But I also think that certain industries, as you
mentioned, probably do impact that, and part of that
is the fact that the digital economy has basically
manifested three or four companies — some of which are
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under investigation by the Justice Department and some
by the FTC — that hold a certain amount of market
share.
Now, that doesn’t mean that just because of
that they violate the antitrust laws, but there has
been a lot of media and academic attention to it, and
now Capitol Hill attention to it, and the agencies are
paying more attention to what Section 2 is.
I don’t think ten years ago if you and I
told our social colleagues who may not be in the
antitrust world, “I practice antitrust law,” their
first question would ask, “What the hell is that?”
Now people know what antitrust law is, for good or
bad, because some them think antitrust should just
preclude any company from getting big.
But we are having that debate, people are
engaging, and I think that is a positive thing for
competition overall.
PROF. SHELANSKI:
MS. DAVIS:

Thank you very much.

I am conscious that we are going
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to lose you very quickly, Executive Vice President
Vestager, but I couldn’t let you get away without
asking a question about the new legislative proposal
in relation to the New Competition Tool.
You mentioned earlier in your remarks the
formidable tools that the European Commission has in
competition law enforcement in Europe.

Those

formidable tools — think about Articles 101 and 102 —
have served the Commission very well over the years
and have formed the backbone of competition policy and
have actually shown themselves to be very flexible in
adapting to new situations.

We have seen that even in

recent times in digital markets.
Is the New Competition Tool really needed or
can you not use the existing formidable toolbox that
you have to achieve the sorts of outcomes that you are
looking for?
EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT VESTAGER:

The

thing is that we really appreciate what Articles 101
and 102 have done, and they will work beautifully for
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a very long future, if not perpetually, because these
are the pillars of what we do.
But what we have been doing for quite some
time is to look at how markets are changing, how
market dynamics are changing.

I have three special

advisers who produced a report, “Competition Policy in
the Digital Era.”

A number of national competition

authorities in other jurisdictions are trying to
figure out how to address the fact that market
dynamics are new — business models are new; we have
network effects; we have marginal cost approaching
zero; we have zero-price markets — so there is
something that we need here in order to make sure that
we remain efficient in what we do.
Basically, we base our work on three
different pillars:
• Obviously, vigilantly to enforce the
existing rules that we have, making full use of
Articles 101 and 102, including interim measures and
restorative remedies.
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• Second, ex ante regulation of platforms,
as mentioned, including additional requirements for
gatekeepers.
• Third, this New Competition Tool.

The

inspiration comes from colleagues quite spread on the
planet.

The CMA in the United Kingdom has done

amazing work with the tools they have at their
disposal, but we have also seen that with other
colleagues and have discussed that.

I think you would

find it within the ICN.
The point is here that our tools enable us
to investigate businesses but we lack the tool to
investigate a market and be able to prevent that
market from tipping.

We have seen that now quite a

number of times, that markets with these network
effects, the marginal costs go down; they tend to tip.
If we want to make sure that these markets
stay contestable, that there is the challenge to every
company to stay innovative, then we will need a new
tool.
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I think there is a global consensus on the
challenge that we have ahead of us.

I think also if

others look into what colleagues have in their toolbox
they would have the same admiration for the work that
they have done.

You should, of course, expect nothing

revolutionary or unheard of, but I think there is a
true need to complement our toolbox and we are
preparing the legislation to be able to do that.
Of course, the important thing that we
always carry in our heart is to make sure that we have
the processes right because it is a Union built on the
rule of law, and that will obviously also be reflected
in how the New Competition Tool should work.
MS. DAVIS:

Some of the criticisms that have

leveled towards the proposals are that intervention in
this way could actually have the opposite effect and
cause harm to competition and innovation.
I was struck when you mentioned in your
remarks earlier that politicians cannot answer who
will win and who will lose very well.
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Some of the types of conduct that may be
targeted by the tool appear indistinguishable from
successful organic growth as the result of innovation
and competition on the merits.
Is there a danger of the Commission
effectively being in the role of picking winners and
losers, and is that something that the Commission
should be involved in in a free-market economy?
EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT VESTAGER:
course not.

Of

If that was the case, we shouldn’t.

But, exactly as you say, when you have a
market economy there has to be a market and the market
has to be free and contestable.
What we have observed is that that is not a
given thing.

Some market dynamics may lead to an

outcome where you do not any more have contestable
markets, where you do not any more have a fair chance
of making it in that marketplace, because of the
characteristics of this market.
I think that is the important thing to have
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in mind, that if you want to serve well the
fundamental mission to have fair competition on the
merits in an open marketplace, then we need to make
sure that our toolkit is up-to-date, because otherwise
we may fail dramatically in serving consumers and
customers in the best possible way.
Of course any tool should be used with
caution, but you need specific tools for specific
issues.

I don’t know if anyone has tried to put in a

screw with a hammer — the result is not very good.
You need indeed to have the right tool for the right
situation, and this is what we are trying to achieve
here.
MS. DAVIS:

Thank you.

VICE PRESIDENT VESTAGER:

I will say good-

bye.
MS. DAVIS:

Thank you very much.

I am sorry

to keep you late.
VICE PRESIDENT VESTAGER:

No, no, no.

I am

so honored that you have invited me again and that you
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have made this happen.

It has indeed been a pleasure

to be here.
Also, of course, I very much appreciate
Makan’s remarks because it is indeed an inspiring and
a learning opportunity to hear colleagues, and also to
be challenged by your questions.
Thank you very much for all the effort and
good luck with the rest of the Conference.
PROF. SHELANSKI: In my last question I would
like to follow on the theme of new tools and also pick
up on a question that was submitted to us from the
audience.

This question goes to you, Makan.
When we look at the Health Judiciary

Committee report, there are a number of proposals that
the Committee makes and they are forward-looking
legislative recommendations of a fairly broad kind.
You said during the course of your remarks
that you think we have the tools to adapt and adjust
to new industries, and you made an interesting point
in your response to my question about conduct cases,
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that it is a question of taking a different risk
perspective, worrying perhaps a little bit more about
error costs on the other side and being a bit bolder
through existing tools.
What is your view of the legislate proposal
and, more generally, the need for new legislation as
articulated in the House Judiciary Committee’s report?
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL DELRAHIM:

First,

I’ve got to congratulate the tremendous amount of good
work that the House Judiciary Committee put into their
report.
It is a process.

As you know, I am a big

believer, as I know you are, in the separation of the
powers.

The Executive Branch and we enforce the law,

and there are certain due process procedures that are
afforded to various folks before you adjudicate
somebody has actually broken the law.
Not to take anything away from that, but
there is a process that ends in the legislative
process — and I have had the privilege of spending
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about five years when I first left private practice to
be on the Senate Judiciary Committee back a little
over twenty years ago when we were looking at
Microsoft — and it is an important process to look at
and fine-tune the tools that we have and the
processes, to take a look at the laws.
There are a number of recommendations.

The

very first one is that the agencies need more
resources.

I think that is a good recommendation.

There are a number of other areas in there,
and we provided some technical assistance to the House
at their request.

We do not have Administration

positions that have been cleared through the Office of
Management and Budget and the Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs that you used to head.

It is a

public process.
But I think generally I would favor changes
that do not throw out the baby with the bathwater.

We

already, I think, over-impose on the courts to force
them to understand.

You have a judge who may not have
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in a twenty-year career ever had an antitrust case and
for the first time who may ask the question, “What the
heck am I supposed to do with this merger?

I have to

be clairvoyant and look into the future of this
effect?

I am used to knowing whether not the guy

entered into an agreement or sold a drug, and I need a
picture and evidence and an eye witness.

That’s what

I’m used to.”
You are asking the judge, plus three
brilliant clerks who just got out of law school who
are helping them, to in six or eight months resolve a
$100 billion merger that the two agencies may have
spent fifty attorneys and economists and God knows the
amount of outside resources the parties and the
brilliant economists — Dennis Carlton, Carl Shapiro,
and Howard Shelanski — that they use.

I think the

system requires some review as well.
I am not a huge fan of specialized courts in
general.

Congress experimented and by and large that

has been successful for patent cases in the Federal
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Circuit.

But Judge Ginsburg had also yet another

innovative idea, almost like a Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court, where the chief justice could
appoint judges with expertise to build a core
competency of antitrust expertise in these cases so
that judges are not just completely shocked and
surprised by the demands of an antitrust case, because
I think the markets require that.
The other is, particularly in the high-tech
area, I think the laws are flexible enough to identify
— certainly the House Judiciary Committee found that
some of the companies violated the laws as they exist.
The agencies go through that.

The question

is: How fast are we going to have an answer to be
responsive, to provide the certainty for the companies
but also to protect the consumers from the vagrancies
or the transgressions by some of these companies that
might occur, new innovations.
I was again pleased that they cited the
Venture Capital Workshop that we held at Stanford in
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February 2020 in their report.

I thought that was

good.
So I would look at the system.

I would also

look at just the system we have in the United States,
the two federal agencies enforcing the antitrust laws,
which sometimes could create confusion and
uncertainty, the structures of them.

I probably have

a personal bias towards one agency, but I am not
saying one or the other is the better model.
Also look at federal versus state.

We

already have potential divergence internationally, but
do we really need that?

I am a big fan of actually

looking at the European model of how the Commission
and the state and the agencies look at it.

For

transactions that do not bleed outside of state lines,
defer more enforcement to the state AGs, to the extent
they want to — some states may not have the interest
or the resources and they would prefer that, but to
the extent they want to, as long as they do not
contradict national competition policy.
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So I think there are a couple of other areas
that I would encourage the policymakers to look at.
But changing predatory pricing — the Brown &
Williamson case from the Supreme Court — we have to be
very careful about how we do that.
I do believe that there are different tests
that I would apply to the Supreme Court’s Amex case,
so I think that is an interesting exploration by the
House and I would welcome looking at how you would do
that.

I am a big believer in the test that we at the

beginning of my tenure proposed to the Supreme Court
in that case, and how the Second Circuit looked at
market definition, and also how you account for
procompetitive justifications of a vertical restraint
in a two-sided market.

I do believe you have to look

at two-sided markets differently, but I do believe the
Second Circuit got it wrong.

Of course, five Justices

disagreed with that view.
But that is an area that I think is rife for
mischief and misinterpretation through litigation, and
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frankly businesses need certainty.
We saw a brilliant judge in Delaware in the
Sabre case who I think just plainly got it wrong, but
that decision is rife for lots of litigation for the
next twenty years unless Congress comes in and puts in
some bright lines.
Those are my general views.
PROF. SHELANSKI:

Thank you.

That is a very

helpful answer.
I think we are coming up on the end of this
session.

Many of us may be looking longingly at

Michele’s espresso machine.
I want to thank you very much, Makan and
Michele, and turn it back to James.
MR. KEYTE: Thank you, Makan, Michele, and
Howard, and Executive Vice President Vestager as well.
That was a wonderful session.
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL DELRAHIM:

Thanks

very much for having me, James, and I look forward to
the rest of your Conference, as always.

